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ABSTRACT 
 
Effort-Based Career Opportunities and Working Time∗ 
 
In this paper we describe the hypothesis of effort-based career opportunities as a situation in 
which profit maximizing firms create incentives for employees to work longer hours than the 
bargained ones, by making career prospects dependent on working hours. When effort-
based career opportunities are effective, they raise working time and output per worker 
reducing workers’ utility. A first attempt is made to empirically estimate the relationship 
between hours worked and the expected opportunities of promotion using the British 
Household Panel Survey data set. Our analysis shows that the perceived probability of 
promotion increases with working time and that this result is robust to various econometric 
specifications. 
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper Bell and Freeman (2001) explain the differences in hours
worked between the US and Germany by the different levels of earnings in-
equality of the two countries. The authors, using cross-section data, find
a positive correlation between earnings inequality at the occupational level
and hours worked. Using longitudinal data, they also find that hours worked
raise both future wages and actual (in the US) or perceived (in Germany)
promotion prospects. As Bell and Freeman (2001) note there might be
several competing explanations for the work hours-future earnings relation-
ship that is found at the empirical level: 1) human capital theory, accord-
ing to which hours worked are an investment in future earnings (on the
job training, see Becker 1963); 2) tournament/incentive models (see for in-
stance Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983, and Landers,
Rebitzer and Taylor, 1996); 3) some underlying ‘third’ factor, such as unob-
served individual ability or effort, which simultaneously affects both working
hours and future earnings. The authors also maintain that the positive re-
lationship between working hours and the probability of promotion is not
necessarily a prediction of human capital models and is more in line with
tournament/incentive models, even though it might still be subject to the
third explanation above.
In the present paper, we build on the hypothesis advanced by Bell and
Freeman (2001), in the following way:
1. we present a simple theoretical model that provides a possible reason
why firms might prefer longer working hours than those bargained or
desired by workers and use effort-based career opportunities to incen-
tivate employees to work longer hours. In such schemes employees’
probability of promotion is directly linked to the number of hours
worked;
2. we use longitudinal UK data to empirically investigate the relationship
between hours worked and the probability of promotion as perceived
by employees. With respect to Bell and Freeman (2001), who ana-
lyzed Germany and the US, we focus on UK data and use panel data
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estimators.
2 The model
We assume that workers live for two periods.1 In the first period they are
hired by a firm in a low skilled position, whereas in the second period they
may be promoted to a high skilled position or remain in the same position.2
In what follows, we shall often refer to jobs and positions interchangeably.
We shall also refer to skilled workers and unskilled workers, referring to
workers filling skilled and unskilled positions, respectively.
We make the following assumptions:
1. unions and firms bargain over hourly wages (and working hours) both
for unskilled and skilled workers;
2. workers cannot change the workplace without incurring costs because
of specific human capital, mobility costs, absence of a continuum of
jobs;
3. because of a perfect complementarity between low and high skilled
jobs, only a fixed proportion p of low skilled workers is promoted to
the high level position;
4. high skilled workers’ productivity is higher than low skilled workers’
productivity;
5. workers’ utility function is additively separable into labor income and
working time.
1Considering an infinite time horizon we obtain qualitatively the same results, but with
more complex algebra.
2Wemake this assumption since here we are mainly interested in internal labor markets,
i.e. markets where workers are hired in entry level jobs and higher levels are filled from
within. A possible reason is reported in Siow (1994): firms might have high hiring costs
for recruiting skilled workers and they offer promotion opportunities in internal labor
markets. Other possible reasons for the emergence of internal labor markets are reviewed
in Lazear and Oyer (2004).
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2.1 Bargaining
We assume a utility function of the type: Uj = R(wj · hj) − g(hj), where
wj is hourly wage and hj are working hours, R(wj · hj) the utility of labor
income and g(hj) the disutility of work. The index j is used to indicate
the two positions that a worker can fill: the unskilled job (j = U) and the
skilled one (j = S).3
Firms’ profits are given by: pij = zjy(hj) − wjhj , where zjy(hj) is the
total revenue function.4 Thereafter, we shall not indicate the index j unless
necessary. We obtain immediately the hours demand function w = zy′(h)
and the hours supply function wR′(w ·h) = g′(h), where x′ indicates the first
derivative of the variable x with respect to its argument and x′′ the second
derivative. The intersection between the two functions gives the competitive
market equilibrium (zy′(h) = g
′(h)
R′(w·h)). In what follows we assume risk neu-
tral or risk adverse individuals and increasing marginal disutility of working
hours.
Bargaining may give rise to different outcomes, whose ‘extreme’ cases are
those in which one of the social parts (firms or workers) acts as a Stackelberg
leader, incorporating the reaction function of the other.
If firms act as leaders, they maximize profits under the constraint of
the labor supply function, w = g
′(h)
R′(w·h) , so that pi = zy(h) − g
′(h)
R′(w·h)h.
It is easy two show that the first order condition gives: zy′(h) = w +
g′′(h)R′(wh)−R′′(wh)g′(h)
[R′(wh)]2 h. For g
′′(h) > 0 and risk adverse or neutral indi-
viduals, the marginal productivity of working time is higher than the hourly
wage. Therefore profit maximizing firms would prefer longer working hours
than the ones supplied by workers.
If workers act as leaders working hours will be chosen along the hours
demand function. By definition, in this case the wage equates the marginal
productivity of labor and there is no space for “constrained firms”. This is
a case where effort-based career opportunities are no longer required5 and
3For the moment we exclude any form of heterogeneity across workers in the parameters
of the utility or profit functions. However, workers’ heterogeneity will be reintroduced in
the empirical model.
4We are implicitly assuming that hourly wage is independent of working hours.
5Unless career opportunities represent also an incentivating device in a framework with
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it will not be considered in the following paragraphs.
In order to reach more meaningful results, in the next section we analyze
a bargaining process between social parts considering two different hypothe-
ses on bargaining: the efficient bargaining model, where firms and workers
bargain over both wages and hours worked, and a ‘right to manage’ model,
where they bargain over wages whereas the working time is freely chosen by
workers.
2.1.1 Efficient bargaining
Hourly wage and working hours are chosen following Nash bargaining. Hence,
firms and workers maximize the following expression:
max
w,h
Λ ≡ [zy(h)− wh]1−µ[R(w · h)− g(h)− Ω]µ (1)
where µ is the contractual strength of workers and Ω indicates workers’
reservation utility.
The first order conditions, respectively with respect to w and h, can be
written as:
1− µ
µ
R(w · h)− g(h)− Ω
zy(h)− wh = R
′(w · h)
1− µ
µ
R(w · h)− g(h)− Ω
zy(h)− wh =
g′(h)− wR′(w · h)
zy′(h)− w
Equating the two right hand-sides of the FOCs we obtain the contract
curve:
R′(w · h) = g
′(h)
zy′(h)
(2)
Wages and working hours must lie alongside the contract curve6. In
order to obtain wages, we substitute the contract curve in the first FOC.
Thereafter, we suppose that the functions R(w ·h), y(h), g(h) have constant
imperfect monitoring on workers’ effort; this possibility exists, but it requires a different
approach from the bargaining one that we develop here.
6In the (w, h) space, the contract curve is downward sloping for risk adverse in-
dividuals. Indeed, by totally differentiating the contract curve we obtain dw
dh
=
z[y′′(h)R′(w·h)+y′(h)R′′(w·h)w]−g′′(h)
zy′(h)R′′(w·h)h , which is obviously a vertical line for risk neutral work-
ers (because R′ becomes a constant parameter).
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elasticities, R, y, g, respectively, and that g > y. After some algebraic
steps, the first FOC becomes:
w =
1−µ
µ
1
g
(
1 + Ωg(h)
)
+ 1y
1−µ
µ
1
R
+ 1
zy′(h) ≡ θEBzy′(h) (3)
Let us call equation (3) the wage curve because it indicates the wage
level emerging from bargaining for each level of working hours. The whole
solution of the model is obviously given by equating equation (2) with (3)
and can be obtained with some simplifying assumptions. Our main interest
is not to solve the model, but to investigate the conditions which make
firms “constrained” on working hours, that is the conditions which make
the marginal productivity of working hours higher than the hourly wage,
i.e. zy′(h) > w . From equation (3) this happens if θEB < 1 which can be
written as:
1− µ
µ
1
Rg
[
g − R
(
1 +
Ω
g(h)
)]
>
1− y
y
(4)
The term in square brackets is always positive if zy′(h) > w holds.7
Therefore, solving for µ in equation (4), we can state that firms are
“constrained” in working hours (zy′(h) > w) if workers bargaining power is
lower than a critical value which, in turn, is lower than unity:
µ <
1 + 1−yy
1
R
−
(
1 + Ωg(h)
)
1
g
−1 < 1 (5)
In this case, firms prefer a higher working time than the bargained one
and they could use effort-based promotion schemes in order to induce work-
ers to work longer hours.8
7Indeed, this term is positive if
g
R
> Ω+g(h)
g(h)
. Given that Ω is the outside option
Ω < R(w · h)− g(h) must hold for every bargained wage and working hours. Substituting
R(w·h)−g(h) for Ω in the right hand-side of the previous equation, we obtain the sufficient
condition:
g
R
≥ R(w·h))
g(h)
. Substituting the definition of the elasticities,
hg′(h)
g(h)
whR′(w·h)
R(wh)
≥
R(w·h)
g(h)
; therefore g′(h) ≥ wR′(w ·h). Using the contract curve of equation (2) to substitute
R′(w·h), the condition becomes zy′(h) ≥ w, which is precisely the condition we are looking
for.
8As observed by Naylor (2002), a firm can force workers off their labor supply curve
thanks to its degree of monopsonistic power, which in turn can originate from the absence
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2.1.2 Right to manage
Workers choose working time along their labor supply function, obtained by
maximizing their utility at a given wage:9
g′(h) = wR′(w · h). (6)
The bargaining problem becomes:
max
w
[zy(h(w))− wh(w)]1−µ[R(w · h(w))− g(h(w))− Ω]µ
where h(w) is implicitly defined by the labor supply function of equation (6).
Differentiating with respect to w and rearranging terms, we obtain the
wage curve:
w =
1−µ
µ
1
g
(
1− Rg−R Ωg(h)
)
+ 1y
1−µ
µ
1
R
(
1− Rg−R Ωg(h)
)
+ 1
zy′(h) ≡ θRMzy′(h) (7)
Also in this case we investigate the condition under which w < zy′(h),
which is equivalent to solving for θRM < 1 from equation (7). After some
algebraic steps, we obtain exactly the same condition of equation (4) where,
also in this case, the term in the square brackets is always positive (see note
7, substituting the hours supply function g′(h) = wR′(w · h)).
Therefore, also in the right to manage case the conclusion concerning
the willingness of firms to increase working hours above the bargained ones
holds if condition (5) is met.
Remark 1 If the workers’ bargaining power is below a given level, firms
prefer longer working hours than the bargained ones both in the case of ef-
ficient bargaining and in the case of working time decided unilaterally by
workers.
of a continuum of jobs, the presence of search and mobility costs, or firm-specific skills.
In this regard, Stewart and Swaffield (1997), using BHPS data, found that age-specific
regional unemployment (a proxy for labor market tightness and absence of a continuum
of jobs) has a significant positive effect on working hours. We shall see that in some
circumstances by linking promotion opportunities to working hours, i.e. by introducing
what we call effort-based promotion schemes, firms can rise their profits, and this is another
reason why they may mainly fill the skilled positions using internal labor markets.
9We do not consider here the case of right to manage model in which firms decide
unilaterally working time, since in this case firms are not constrained in terms of working
hours and there are no reasons to introduce effort-based promotion schemes.
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2.1.3 A synthesis
In figure 1 we present a case where the condition (5) is met, so that firms
would prefer longer working hours at the given hourly wage10. Therefore,
the wage curve (equation (3) or (7)) is below the labor demand curve. We
show graphically the outcome of bargaining in the two cases outlined above.
The intersection between the wage curve and the labor supply gives the (not
Pareto efficient) equilibrium in the right to manage case (RTM), whereas the
intersection between the wage curve and the contract curve gives the (Pareto
efficient) equilibrium in the case of efficient bargaining (EB; the points UL
and FL indicate the case of union leader and firm leader, respectively)11.
Note that, as Naylor (2002) pointed out, in the EB case employees
work longer hours than the desired ones at the current wage, i.e the EB
equilibrium is on the right of the labor supply curve. Both in the EB and
RTM cases the equilibrium is on the left of the labor demand curve: if firms
were able to persuade workers to work longer hours at the given bargained
hourly wage they would increase their profits at the expenses of workers’
utility.
2.2 The effects of effort-based career opportunities
Let us now consider the case in which firms, once the work contract has
been signed, prefer longer working hours than the bargained ones (condition
5 is met) and use effort-based promotion schemes as a device to incentivate
workers, who are always better off in the skilled position than in the unskilled
one since we assumed that zS > zU (assumption 4 in section 2).12
10The figure considers the case of risk neutral workers, with a vertical contract curve.
11In the simplified case in which workers are risk neutral (R = 1) and the outside
option is zero (Ω = 0) the optimal values in the efficient bargaining model are: h∗ =(
yz
g
) 1
g−y and w∗ = yz
(
1−µ
g
+ µ
y
)
h∗(y−1), whereas results for the right to manage
are h∗ = z
(
y(1−µ)+gµ
2g
) 1
g−y and w∗ = g
(
1
h∗
)1−g .
12By totally differentiating equation (1) with respect to z and using the envelope theo-
rem we obtain: dΛ
∗
dz
= (1−µ) ∂pi
∗
∂z
pi∗ = (1−µ) y(h
∗)
pi∗ which is surely positive. So that Λ must
increase with z. In the EB model we can write the first FOC as:
U(w, h) =
1− µ
µ
R′(w, h)pi(w, h, z)
9
Figure 1: Bargaining
w
h
isoprofits
isoutility
labour demand
labour
supply
wage equation
EB
RTM
contract
curve
isoutility
UL
FL
Legend: EB Efficient bargaining equilibrium; RTM right to manage equilibrium; UL
Union leader Stackelberg equilibrium; FL Firm leader Stackelberg equilibrium.
Note. The figure depicts the case of risk neutral workers.
We are considering a situation (EB case) in which, in a first stage, bar-
gaining between trade unions and firms defines the wage rate and the stan-
dard working hours, whereas, in a second stage, each worker can freely
choose her overtime hours.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the effort-based promotion
schemes take the form of rank-order tournaments a` la Lazear and Rosen
In the case of risk neutral individuals R′(w, h) = constant, i.e. the derivative of the utility
function with respect to the parameter z has the same sign of the derivative of the profit
function, so, given the previous result that Λ is increasing in z, both utility and profits
must grow with z.
It can be shown that workers are always better-off in the skilled position also in the case
of risk adverse workers (the proof is available upon request from the authors).
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(1981) and focus here on the case of two workers, one of which must be
promoted by a firm. Firms promote the worker with the larger working
time, i.e. hi, while if workers work the same amount of hours promotion is
random. As in Lazear and Rosen (1981) we assume that each worker is not
able to observe the working time of her opponent, or that she does not know
her opponent, and consequently she plays against the “market”. Worker’s i
actual working hours (hai ) are defined by:
hai = hi + ei (8)
where hi is the working time chosen by the worker and ei a stochastic term,
determined for instance by workers’ health status.
Let us indicate with 1 and 2 the subscripts for the two workers. The
probability that worker 1 is promoted, i.e. she wins the tournament, is
given by:
p1 = Pr(ha1 > h
a
2) = Pr(h1− h2 > e2− e1) = Pr(h1− h2 > e) = F (h1− h2)
(9)
where e = e2 − e1 and F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of e. We
define f(·) as the density function of e.
Let us define UU and US the single period expected utility of workers in
unskilled and skilled jobs, respectively and ∆U = US − UU .13
With career opportunities based on working time, the life-time expected
utility of the unskilled worker 1 (V1) is:
V1 = R(wBh1)− g(h1) + β [F (h1 − h2)∆U ] + β[wBhB − g(hB)] (10)
where β is the discount factor, wB the wage emerging from bargaining (given
by the solution of equations (2) and (3) in the EB case or equations (6) and
(7) in the RTM one.) and the last term indicates that an unskilled worker
in the second period works precisely the bargained hours.
The choice variable for the unskilled worker 1 is h1: she can choose to
work longer hours than the bargained ones (which we label as hB, solution
13Given that in the second period workers have no longer the incentive to work longer
hours, since promotion is not possible any more, they will work the number of hours
bargained (or preferred). Then, ∆U does not depend on h1 and turns out to be increasing
in zS and decreasing in zU .
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of equations (2) and (3) or (6) and (7)) choosing a working time of h∗1, so
that h∗1 ≥ hB must always hold.
Maximizing the life-time expected utility with respect to working hours
of worker 1 (h1), we obtain:
g′(h1) = R′(wBh1)wB + β
∂F (h1 − h2)
∂h1
∆U (11)
which defines h∗1, the working time that is chosen if effort-based promotion
schemes are used by firms. Following Lazear and Rosen (1981), we use here
the Nash-Cournot assumption that each worker considers the working hours
of her opponent as given, since she plays against the market. Therefore:
∂F (h1 − h2)
∂h1
= f(h1 − h2) > 0, (12)
which is equivalent to saying that workers with longer working hours expect
a higher probability of promotion.
We wonder if this working time is higher than the bargained one.
In the EB case14, depending on:
• the value of ∆U , therefore on the “tournament prize”, which we label
the as “skill premium”, i.e. the increase in the single period utility
gained from promotion;
• the increase in the probability to be promoted with respect to work-
ing hours, f(h1 − h2), therefore on the way firms have proposed the
promotion scheme;
we obtain that the working time that workers actually choose may be higher
than or equal to the bargained one.15 Therefore, effort-based promotion
14Comparing equation (11) with the contract curve (equation (2)) a sufficient but non
necessary condition in order to have h∗1 > h
B , so that g′(h∗1) > g
′(hB) is:
R′(wBh∗1)w
B > R′(wBhB)zy′(hB) = R′(wBhB)
wB
θEB
where the right-hand-side is obtained from equation (3). This condition is never met. But
we were dealing with a sufficient non necessary condition. Hence, the working time workers
choose considering the career opportunities may be equal or higher than the bargained
one.
15Graphically, this result depends on the fact that in efficient bargaining, working hours
are higher than the desired ones (the point EB in figure 1 is on the right of the hours
supply function).
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schemes are not necessarily always effective in increasing working hours.
In the RTM case, we can substitute the hours supply function of equa-
tion (6) into equation (11), to obtain:
R′(wBhB)wB −R′(wBh1)wB = βf(h1 − h2)∆U (13)
then suppose that h∗1 = hB, so that workers prefer a working time not higher
than the bargained one. In this case the left-hand-side is zero whereas the
right-hand-side is positive. Therefore, h∗1 > hB must hold: in the right to
manage model we can state that an effort-based promotion scheme always
raises working time.
Remark 2 When partners act according to the RTM and firms use effort-
based promotion schemes employees always prefer to work longer hours than
the bargained ones.
Considering equation (11) we can state that:
Remark 3 When effort-based career opportunities are effective, working
hours depend positively on the responsiveness of the probability of promotion
to working time (f(h1 − h2)) and the increase in utility if promoted (∆U).
2.3 Welfare effects and workers’ cooperation
Assume the results of remarks 1 and 3 hold. If all workers are assumed to
behave in the same way, each of them decides her working hours in the way
described by equation (11). When a Nash equilibrium exists,16 simmetry
implies that h1 = h2 = h, i.e. all employees work the same amount of hours.
Hence, the probability to be promoted is for every worker at its ‘natural’
level (p1 = p2 = 1/2), but employees work longer hours than the ones each
of them would have chosen in the absence of effort-based incentives.
Nevertheless, none of them can reduce her working hours below the one
described by equation (11) without incurring in a reduction of the promotion
probability.
In terms of game theory, if promotion schemes are effective, the equilib-
rium described by equation (11) is a not Pareto-efficient Nash-equilibrium.
16See Lazer and Rosen (1981, p. 845) on the existence of such an equilibrium.
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Table 1: Worker’s expected utility
Worker 1
cooperate non cooperate
Worker 2 cooperate V B,B1 , V
B,B
2 V
∗,B
1 , V
B,∗
2
non cooperate V B,∗1 , V
∗,B
2 V
∗,∗
2 , V
∗,∗
2
To show this result, consider a firm with two workers. Let us call V κυ1 the
expected utility of worker 1 who plays the strategy κ when worker 2 plays υ,
where κ and υ represent two possible strategies: choosing bargained hours
(hB, which we define cooperative behavior) or choosing hours considering
effort-based opportunities (h∗, which we define non-cooperative behavior).
It should be clear that, if remarks 3 holds, worker 1 prefers to work
h∗ hours regardless the behavior of the other worker, i.e. V ∗υ1 > V Bυ1 for
υ = ∗, B. We can therefore state that V ∗B1 > V BB1 and that V ∗∗1 > V B∗1 .
Furthermore, consider equation (10): in the case workers choose the same
behavior, the probability to be promoted is p1 = p2 = 1/2. Therefore, from
equation (10) we can write:
V BB1 − V ∗∗1 = R(wBhB)− g(hB)− [R(wBh∗)− g(h∗)], with h∗ > hB
But in the case of the RTM model hB is alongside the labor supply curve,
so it must be the optimal working time given the wage wB; in the case of
EB model (with zy′(h) > w) bargained working hours must lie on the right
of the labor supply curve (see figure 1), so that workers would prefer lower
working hours than the bargained ones: V BB1 > V
∗∗
1 . Consequently, we can
state that V ∗B1 > V BB1 > V ∗∗1 > V B∗1 .
It is clear that the strategy of choosing the bargained hours is always
dominated. This happen for both workers, so that the Nash equilibrium is
to work a number of hours that is consistent with the effort-based promotion
scheme, i.e. h1 = h2 = h∗. Obviously, this equilibrium is not Pareto efficient.
Table 1 illustrates the outcome of the effort-based promotion hypothesis,
representing the payoff matrix. The strategy to cooperate (i.e, to decide
together with the other workers the working time in a binding commitment)
14
is dominated by the strategy not to cooperate. However, we have assumed
in section 2 that individuals live for two periods and promotion can take
place in the second period only, i.e. that the game is a one-shot game.
Nevertheless, if the decision concerning working hours is taken by workers
an indefinite number of times, as it is well known from game theory, the
cooperative equilibrium may emerge.
Remark 4 If remark 1 holds, firms profits increase with effort-based ca-
reer opportunities. If remark 3 holds, workers optimal strategy is to accept
working longer hours. Unless workers cooperate, when firms use effort-based
promotion schemes, each worker works longer hours than the ones she would
have chosen, and has the same probability to be promoted. Workers’ utility
is reduced; people work longer hours enjoying less leisure.
In such a situation, as in Naylor (2001), unions could act as a counter-
vailing power, by increasing the cohesion and cooperation among workers
and reducing the effectiveness of effort base promotion schemes.
3 The BHPS data
In the empirical analysis we use data from the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), a British representative survey that gathers a wealth of
information on households’, individuals’ and job characteristics.17 We use
data from the first 10 waves of this survey, which refer to the years 1991-2000.
The relevant question in the survey for our purposes is the following: “In
the current job do you have opportunities for promotion?”, whose possible
answers are yes or no. We label this dummy variable as CAREER. We
use this variable as a proxy for the value of a worker’s expected probability
of future promotion (pi) in the theoretical model. Using information on
the number of hours normally worked per week (excluding overtime) and on
the number of overtime hours in normal week we compute the total hours
normally worked per week. The ratio between the the usual net pay per
month in the current job, available from the survey and the total hours
17See Taylor (2001) for an introduction to the BHPS.
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normally worked per week (times 4.34) gives the hourly net wage that we
use in our empirical estimates.18
From the first 10 waves of the BHPS we select a sample of individuals
who worked 20 or more hours per week.19 So do we since we want to focus
only on people for whom working in the marketplace is the main activity
and whose working time is more likely to be responsive to career prospects
(compared to ‘marginal’ or less career motivated workers).20 We drop from
the original sample (which includes 111,206 observations) also people in non-
civilian occupations, self-employed workers and observations with missing
data for at least one of the variables included in the econometric model and
obtain a sample of 43,926 observations. In order to have a first look at
the relationship between hours worked and career opportunities we report
in Tables 2 and 3 the average working hours, the fraction of individuals
having promotion opportunities in the current job, and the preferred working
hours by quintile of the working hours distribution for men and women,
respectively. It is immediate to note that there seems to exist a positive
relationship between hours worked and the expected opportunities of career
advancement in the current job. Moreover, individuals working longer hours
are more likely to prefer a shorter working time, suggesting that employers
can force employees to work longer hours than the latter prefer21 and that
also in the UK data it is possible to observe the ‘hours surplus’ reported
in US and German data by Bell and Freeman (2001). These are only raw
summary statistics of course and the positive correlation between working
hours and promotion opportunities may be only spurious and driven by
the different characteristics of workers in the different quintiles of the hours
distribution. For this reason, in our empirical analysis we shall take into
account workers’ observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
18As observed by Bell and Freeman (2001) wages computed in this way may be affected
by a considerable measurement error.
19We exclude individuals with more than 90 working hours per week.
20A similar sample selection criterion has been applied in the recent literature by
Bell and Freeman (2001) and Booth et al. (2003). In particular, Bell and Freeman
(2001) observe that including also part-timers in the analysis strongly weakens the income
inequality-hours relationship.
21In this regard see also Stewart and Swaffield (1997).
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Table 2: Quintiles of the work hours distribution, opportunity of career and
preferred hours (BHPS data) - Men
Quintiles of weekly Average normal Promotion opportunities Preferred working hours
hours worked working hours no yes less more equal
1 35.06 47.32 52.68 21.94 10.86 67.21
2 39.83 48.21 51.79 27.30 7.81 64.89
3 43.57 42.37 57.63 34.12 7.19 58.69
4 48.50 42.06 57.94 43.16 5.34 51.49
5 59.83 44.15 55.85 55.18 3.84 40.98
Note. 1991-2000 BHPS data, pooled sample.
Table 3: Quintiles of the work hours distribution, opportunity of career and
preferred hours (BHPS data) - Women
Quintiles of weekly Average normal Promotion opportunities Preferred working hours
hours worked working hours no yes less more equal
1 24.57 62.38 37.62 16.65 12.30 71.05
2 35.63 51.75 48.25 34.50 4.95 60.55
3 38.52 48.59 51.41 38.40 3.63 57.97
4 40.99 45.19 54.81 40.02 3.11 56.87
5 50.06 37.91 62.09 55.67 2.45 41.88
Note. 1991-2000 BHPS data, pooled sample.
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4 Empirical analysis
An immediate implication of the simple theoretical model outlined in sec-
tion 2 is that if firms use effort-based promotion schemes workers’ expected
probability of future promotion depends positively on current working time.
In particular, in our framework workers with longer working hours expect
ceteris paribus a higher probability of future promotion. The ideal data
to test this implication would be employer-employee matched data, where
it would be possible to control for the relative working time of employees
within the same firm. Unfortunately, such data are not readily available and
we use longitudinal micro-data, instead. In particular, we include among the
explanatory variables some controls for employers’ characteristics (such as
sector of activity, number of employees) and observed employees’ characteris-
tics (such as education and age, among the others), which will be considered
as proxies for the working time that employers and employees bargain in cer-
tain types of firms. However, as observed by Bell and Freeman (2001), the
correlation between hours worked and the expected probability of promotion
may be only spurious and determined by some unobservable ‘third factor’
simultaneously affecting working time and the likelihood of promotion. In
order to mitigate this problem of simultaneity bias we use panel data meth-
ods. In particular, the unobserved heterogeneity across individuals will be
accounted for by directly modelling it as random or fixed effects.
In what follows, we estimate a panel data logit model of workers’ per-
ceived probability of future promotion of the following type:
pi = a0 + a1hi + a2X1i + a3X2i + ui + it (14)
where i and t are subscripts for individuals and time, respectively. pi is
an indicator variable which equals one if individual i expects to be promoted
in the current job and zero otherwise. ui is, depending on the type of model
chosen, an individual fixed or a random effect. hi are working hours, X1i a
vector of personal characteristics, X2i a vector of employer’s characteristics
and it an error term. Our coefficient of interest is a1, i.e. the relation
between working hours and a worker’s perceived probability of promotion.
At this stage we are mainly interested in the sign and the significance of the
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correlation a1. We interpret a positive and significant coefficient a1, once
we account for both individual observed and unobserved heterogeneity, as
evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that firms use effort based
promotion schemes.22
We include in the empirical specifications several controls for personal
and job characteristics. The full list of control variables with some descrip-
tive statistics is reported in Appendix A. We include among the regressors
real hourly wages, year dummies, gender, family composition, a quadratic
in age, travel time to workplace, home property, spouse’s employment sta-
tus, parents’ social class, education, a dummy for temporary job, sector of
activity, socio-economic group, firm size, dummy for public sector and a
quadratic in tenure.
We start the analysis with a simple logit model on the pooled sample.
With such a model the observations are considered independent (as in a
cross-section), i.e. we do not exploit the fact that some observations refer
to the same person and do not take into account individual unobserved at-
tributes in the estimation method.23 In order to avoid all problems related
to the potential self-selection of women into employment, we estimate the
working hours-promotion opportunities relationship only for men. We are
aware of the fact that the working hours-promotion probability relationship
might be especially strong for women who traditionally have to split their
time between family and work, and have therefore a higher variance in the
number of hours offered in the labor market. Since we use panel data meth-
ods, we also exclude from the sample all individuals with only one time
observation.
In Table 4 for each model we report the results of two specifications,
one including among the explanatory variables the total number of hours
worked only (1), and the other including the full set of controls (2). In
both specifications the working time is highly statistically significant. In
22On the grounds that our random or fixed effects account for all possible factors si-
multaneously affecting both promotion and working time, the estimated effect a1 also
represents the “true causal effect” of working time on the likelihood of promotion.
23However, standard errors shown in Table 4 account for the fact that observations for
the same individual are correlated.
19
general, in the pooled logit models, we observe that including the control
variables changes (in particular increases) the magnitude of the effect of
hours worked on the expected promotion probability. This confirms that
individuals with different observed characteristics have different expected
probabilities of promotion. The marginal effect in model 2, which includes
the full set of controls, is 0.36 percent points (0.20 in model 1), i.e. increasing
by one weekly working hours is associated with an increase in the expected
probability of promotion of 0.36 per cent points.24
In a second step we exploit the longitudinal structure of our sample and
use panel data estimators. We estimate two models, a fixed effects (FE)
conditional logit model (see Chamberlain 1980) and a random effects (RE)
logit model. When using the FE conditional logit model it is necessary to use
only the observations for which the value of the CAREER dummy changes
over time (‘movers’). This implies that we are working with a potentially
selected sample, with the possibility of introducing in the analysis a sample
selection bias (see Heckman, 1979). This is likely to be the case since by
using the FE model we loose 1,922 individuals, representing about the 50%
of the sample. In particular, we are likely to exclude all variation in career
opportunities between individuals who never had opportunities of career
advancement and those who always had it, giving a special emphasis to
the within-individuals variation. The coefficient of working hours remains
statistically significant in both the RE (at the 1% statistical level) and the
FE models (at the 5% level) including the full set of controls. Hence, the
positive correlation between working hours and the probability of promotion
is confirmed and turns out to be robust to panel data methods. In what
follows we give a special emphasis to the RE estimator, which enables us to
use a larger sample and reduce the risk of sample selection bias. However,
in order to justify our choice we have to show that the estimates obtained
using the two methods are similar. Hence, we estimate the RE model only
in the sample of ‘movers’ and obtain a coefficient of working hours of 0.008,
significant at the 10% level. It is evident that when estimated in the same
sample the RE and FE models give remarkably similar estimates of the
24Marginal effects are computed at the sample mean.
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effect of working hours. From the RE model estimated on the full sample,
we obtain a marginal effect of 0.36 percent points, which is identical to the
estimate from the pooled logit model. Moreover, it must be noted that the
RE estimates of the effect of working hours are very robust to the inclusion
of the control variables, which reduces the risk that our estimates suffer
from a substantial omitted variable bias. From Table 4, it also appears that
the estimated marginal effects are rather similar to those found by Bell and
Freeman (2001) on German data for the specification including educational
controls.25 In order to have an idea of other explanatory variables, we report
their marginal effects for the RE specification (2) in Appendix B.
Therefore, we generally find in the BHPS data a positive and signifi-
cant correlation between total weekly working hours and worker’s perceived
probability of future promotion in the current job. Although we have in-
cluded in the empirical model several potential explanatory variables for
working hours such as firm size, sector and workers’ personal characteris-
tics, we are comparing workers in different firms and for this reason overtime
hours can be a better proxy for the position of each worker in the working
hours distribution within a firm (that is the variable determining the pro-
motion probability in our theoretical model). Moreover, firms may use some
variants of the effort-based promotion scheme outlined in section 2. For in-
stance, in order to choose the workers to be promoted firms might use only
overtime or unpaid overtime work. For these reasons we re-estimated the RE
models using the specification including all control variables (model 2) and
substituting total working hours with overtime and unpaid overtime hours,
respectively.26 The results are shown in Table 5. The effect of overtime
work on the probability of promotion is significant at the 1% level and the
marginal effect is 0.4 per cent points, higher than that of normal working
hours. The effect is higher than that found by Booth et al. (2001) in their
analysis on the effect on actual promotions of overtime work in the UK (0.1
25Using the marginal effect of the hours measured in logarithms from table 7, column
(2’), in their article, and dividing it by the average number of hours in the period 1985-95
reported in table 1, we obtain a marginal effect on the expected probability of promotion
of increasing by one the hours worked of 0.24 per cent points.
26Booth et al. (2001) include both these variables as proxies of workers’ effort in their
empirical model of actual promotions in the UK.
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per cent points).27
The effect of unpaid overtime is positive and statistically significant at
the 10% and the marginal effect is 0.26 per cent points, lower than in the
previous case. This seems to suggest that the expected probability of pro-
motion is more responsive to overtime hours than to total working hours or
unpaid overtime hours. This is consistent with a model in which firms use
overtime hours to determine workers’ probability of promotion.
In what follows we explore another implication of our model. In section 2
we have seen that firms are more likely to be constrained in terms of desired
working hours when the bargaining power of workers is not very high. One
might expect the bargaining power of workers to be higher in firms in which
employees are organized into a union. Therefore, we estimate the RE logit
model including the full set of control variables using as an explanatory vari-
able total working hours, overtime hours and unpaid overtime, respectively,
and interacting these measures with the presence of a union in the workplace.
The results are shown in Table 6. When we consider total working hours the
interaction term is not statistically significant. When we include overtime
work, the effect of the interaction term is of the expected sign (negative)
but not very precisely estimated and only marginally not significant at the
10% level (the p-value is 0.102). The effect of the interaction term between
unpaid overtime and presence of a union in the workplace is negative (as
expected) and only marginally not significant at the 5% level. We remind
the reader that the negative sign is what is expected given that in firms in
which workers have a higher bargaining power, for which the union dummy
is a proxy, effort based promotion schemes are less likely to be adopted. In
particular the gap in the effect of unpaid overtime between non unionized
and unionized firms is about -0.57 percent points, ranging from 0.46 for
non unionized firms and -0.11 for unionized firms. This evidence supports
the idea that in firms in which workers bargaining power is high employers
might not be able to adopt effort-based promotion schemes so as overtime,
when it is done, has no effect (in our estimates it even has a detrimental
effect) on the likelihood of promotion. The positive and significant effect of
27This is what our model predicts if workers expect a ‘reaction’ of their colleagues, in
terms of increasing hours worked, weaker than the actual one.
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the presence of a union within a firm on the probability of promotion can
be interpreted as evidence that internal labor markets are more likely to
emerge when workers’ bargaining power is high.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we build on the empirical findings in Bell and Freeman (2001),
of a positive relationship between working hours and expected or actual
probabilities of employees’ promotion, to show why firms may be interested
in using effort-based promotion schemes, i.e. schemes in which promotions
positively depend on working hours, to increase working hours supplied by
employees.
With a simple bargaining model we describe the case in which a firm, in
order to maximize profits, prefer longer working hours than the bargained
ones if unions’ bargaining power is lower than a given level. In this situation,
firms can incentivate employees to work longer hours than the ones bargained
by making career advancement depend on working hours. The increase
in employees’ working hours depends positively on the size of the “skill-
premium”, i.e. the increase in the utility gained from promotion, and on
the sensitivity of the promotion probability to working time.
With the adoption of career opportunities based on working time on
the part of firms, each worker might work more in order to increase her
probability of career advancement, but, in a symmetrical equilibrium, all
employees will work longer hours and have the same probability of a career
advancement. Only if workers cooperate, they can resist the opportunistic
behavior of working more than their colleagues.
Career opportunities based on working time might raise working hours,
production, profits and per-capita GDP, at the cost of a reduction in workers’
utility.
Our theoretical model is coherent with some stylized facts observed in
the UK labor market such as the inverted-U shaped age profile in actual
work hours (Stewart and Swaffield 1995), since only relatively young work-
ers (less than 35) are more likely to experience career advancements. Our
model is also able to explain a number of phenomena such as gender dif-
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ferences in career advancements or the comparative advantage in terms of
career opportunities of women choosing traditionally female dominated sec-
tors or jobs. The first may stem from the lower number of hours worked by
married or cohabiting women who also have home responsibilities, the sec-
ond from the fact that women choosing female dominated sectors are more
likely to compete with women (who work relatively less hours) for career
advancements.
We seek some empirical evidence for the UK supporting our claim that
the ‘hours surplus’ puzzle discussed in Bell and Freeman (2001), i.e. the
fact that most employees would prefer to work less hours, may originate
from firms using effort-based promotion schemes. Our analysis of the BHPS
data shows that there is indeed a highly statistically significant positive cor-
relation between hours worked and workers’ expected probability of future
promotion. Use of panel data estimators confirms that this result is robust
to the potential presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
In summary, the use of effort-based promotion schemes seems to be in
place also in the UK in addition to Germany and the US (see Bell and
Freeman, 2001). As we have shown, these practices may have interesting
implications in terms of reducing workers’ welfare. Our theoretical analysis
suggests that setting upper limits to working time, through collective agree-
ments or by law may increase workers’ utility, at the cost of a reduction in
per capita GDP: if our model assumptions are correct, workers would like
to substitute higher leisure to lower income.
For future research, it would be interesting to apply the analysis in this
paper to data sets relating to other countries and to employers-employees
matched data to assess how spread these practices are across countries, and
to quantify the precise effect of hours worked on workers’ expected or actual
promotions at firm level.
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Appendix
Table A1: Control variables used in the econometric estimates (BHPS data)
variable description
whreal real hourly wage
year year (11)
individual characteristics
nch02 number of children in the household aged 0-2
nch34 number of children in the household aged 3-4
nch511 number of children in the household aged 5-11
nch1215 number of children in the household aged 12-15
age age at date of interview
age2 age squared at date of interview
nchild number of own children in the household
property house property (4)
jbttwt minutes spent travelling to work
spjb whether spouse/partner employed now (Y/N)
socclas parents social class (7)
educa highest academic qualification (7)
workplace characteristics
temporary temporary job (Y/N)
sect sector (9)
skillseg socio economic group (12)
size2 firm size (5)
public private sector (Y/N)
tenure tenure
tenure2 tenure squared
unionjob union at worplace (Y/N)
Note. In brackets are reported the number of categories for categorical variables.
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Table A2: Coefficients, standard errors and marginal effects for control variables (RE
model with full controls using total working hours, see Table 4)
Variable Coeff. s.e. m.e. mean
htot 0.015 *** 0.003 0.004 45.105
whreal 0.008 0.009 0.002 6.149
nch02 0.241 ** 0.113 0.058 0.094
nch34 -0.001 0.110 0.000 0.090
nch511 0.199 ** 0.087 0.048 0.297
nch1215 0.143 0.089 0.034 0.168
age -0.013 0.022 -0.003 36.819
age2 -0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 1489.190
nchild -0.152 * 0.084 -0.037 0.644
temporary -2.096 *** 0.156 -0.446 0.030
unionjob 0.883 *** 0.070 0.210 0.474
jbttwt 0.002 0.001 0.000 25.346
public 0.281 ** 0.114 0.067 0.212
tenure -0.157 *** 0.014 -0.038 8.683
tenure2 0.004 *** 0.000 0.001 116.946
Home property
house rented 0.004 0.430 0.001 0.202
house owned outright 0.084 0.438 0.021 0.118
house owned with mortgage 0.236 0.430 0.057 0.677
other reference
Spouse’s work
no spouse reference
spouse does not work 0.043 0.109 0.010 0.162
spouse work 0.039 * 0.084 0.009 0.561
Industry dummy
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, Fishing reference
Mining and Quarrying 0.231 0.201 0.056 0.055
Manufacturing 0.122 0.177 0.030 0.149
Electricity, Gas and Water 0.032 0.180 0.008 0.123
Construction -0.024 0.199 -0.006 0.056
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants 0.222 0.179 0.054 0.157
Transport, Storage and Communications 0.535 *** 0.191 0.127 0.088
Finance, Insurance, Business Services 0.408 ** 0.182 0.098 0.135
Community, Social and Personal Services 0.096 0.186 0.024 0.200
Socio-Economic Group
managers,large 1.916 *** 0.365 0.444 0.142
managers,small 1.564 *** 0.367 0.364 0.072
professional employees 1.865 *** 0.373 0.433 0.078
int. non-manual,workers 1.694 *** 0.367 0.394 0.105
int. non-man,foreman 2.310 *** 0.380 0.521 0.036
junior non-manual 1.771 *** 0.364 0.412 0.107
personal service wkrs 1.347 *** 0.405 0.312 0.017
foreman manual 1.693 *** 0.362 0.394 0.083
skilled manual wkrs 0.796 ** 0.357 0.175 0.197
semi-skilled manual wkrs 1.134 *** 0.359 0.259 0.123
unskilled manual wkrs 0.777 ** 0.381 0.170 0.029
farmers managers reference
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cont’d
Variable Coeff. s.e. m.e. mean
Education
higher degree reference
1st degree 0.551 ** 0.225 0.127 0.129
hnd,hnc,teaching 0.381 * 0.242 0.090 0.087
a level 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.239
o level -0.132 0.227 -0.033 0.265
cse -0.074 0.260 -0.018 0.069
none of these 0.043 0.240 0.010 0.180
Firm size (no. of employees)
1-9 reference
10-49 0.314 *** 0.086 0.078 0.261
50 - 99 0.666 *** 0.106 0.165 0.127
100 - 499 1.022 *** 0.095 0.248 0.276
500 or more 1.143 *** 0.106 0.274 0.191
Parents’ social class
professional reference
managerial and technical 0.344 * 0.194 0.085 0.234
skilled non-manual 0.297 0.203 0.073 0.156
skilled manual 0.327 * 0.196 0.081 0.286
partly skilled 0.395 * 0.220 0.097 0.101
unskilled 0.150 0.289 0.037 0.029
Inapplicable 0.265 0.206 0.066 0.143
Year
1991 reference
1992 -0.136 0.148 -0.025 0.030
1993 -0.336 ** 0.143 -0.064 0.034
1994 -0.841 *** 0.139 -0.177 0.037
1995 -0.984 *** 0.101 -0.212 0.110
1996 -1.015 *** 0.103 -0.219 0.115
1997 -0.924 *** 0.106 -0.197 0.120
1998 -0.939 *** 0.109 -0.201 0.133
1999 -0.998 *** 0.111 -0.215 0.167
2000 -1.278 *** 0.118 -0.285 0.160
Note. ∗ significant at the 10%; ∗∗ significant at the 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at the 1%. Stan-
dard errors are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity. Marginal effects (m.e.) are
computed at the sample mean.
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